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WHO'S THE BOSS?: NEW YORK FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURT HOLDS THAT SIGHT-SEEING FLIGHTS ARE NOT
REGULATED BY THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF
1994-SEAAIR NY, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK,
2000 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 12115.
TRAvis M. PERRY
T HE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT of 1994 mandates that
the federal aviation regulatory scheme preempts any and all
state and local airline regulations related to the service of an air
carrier.' The act states that a "political subdivision of a
State... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transporta-
tion. 12 The Rules of the City of New York ("RCNY") provide
that "the use of a seaplane base or airport on city property re-
quires a yearly permit from the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Business Services. ' In SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of New York,
a federal district court granted summary judgment for the City
of New York ("New York") and held that SeaAir could not pro-
vide seaplane air tours or sightseeing tours out of New York
City.4 The East 23rd Street Seaplane Base ("Seaplane Base"),
where SeaAir operated its tours from, was granted a permit in
August of 1999, with the condition that air tours would not be
permitted from this base.5 The court held that SeaAir was not
an air carrier as defined by federal law because it did not pro-
vide air transportation.' Therefore, the Airline Deregulation
I See SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 99-C6055, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12115 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2000); see also, Airline Deregulation Act of 1994, 49
U.S.C.S. § 41713(b)(1).
2 See 49 U.S.C.S. § 41713(b) (1).
3SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *2.
4 Id. at *1.
5 Id. at *1-2.
6 Id. at *3.
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Act did not apply to SeaAir, and federal law did not preempt
local law in this case.'
SeaAir argued that it does indirectly provide air transporta-
tion; therefore, the Airline Deregulation Act exempts New York
from regulating its service.' A complete review of the facts
shows that the court may have granted summary judgment for
New York in haste. New York, as a moving party, must shift the
burden of proof by showing that no reasonable factfinder could
find for SeaAir if the issue were to go to trial." If New York did
not meet this burden, then summary judgment should not have
been granted."' New York did not meet this burden, and SeaAir
did provide enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find
for them. Therefore summary judgment was not appropriate.
In the City of New York, an RCNY regulation provides that the
Commissioner of the Department of Business Services may grant
a yearly permit that allows a seaplane base to operate. ' The
Commissioner, however, may only issue the permit under the
condition that the base "will not be detrimental to the public
safety and will be in the public interest."' 2
SeaAir, a seaplane company, used the Seaplane Base to pro-
vide both air tours and charter services.'" The bulk of SeaAir's
business was derived from its sightseeing air tours.' 4 In March
1999, SeaAir began offering air tours from the Seaplane Base.' 5
In August of 1999, the Seaplane Base was granted its yearly per-
mit with the restriction that the Seaplane Base could not pro-
vide service for sightseeing tours.' 6 Thus, SeaAir was no longer
able to provide its most profitable service.
SeaAir and New York filed motions for summary judgment in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.' 7 SeaAir claimed that the action by New York violated the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1994, the Federal Aviation Act, the
Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protec-
7 Id. at *6.
8 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6 n.1.
9 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
10 See id.
I, SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *2.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at *3.
'5 Id. at *2.
16 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *2-3.
17 Id. at *1.
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tion Clause, and the Commerce Clause. 8 The court granted
summary judgment to New York on all counts and denied
SeaAir's motion for summary judgment. 9 By finding summary
judgment, the court held that no reasonable person could find
for SeaAir on any of these claims.2 1
Regarding SeaAir's violation of due process claim, the court
found that New York's action did not violate SeaAir's due pro-
cess. 2 1 In order to prevail on its due process claim, SeaAir was
required to show that New York's government action was "arbi-
trary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional
sense," and not simply "incorrect or ill advised. ' 22 The court
reasoned that New York did not violate the Due Process Clause
because it was simply trying to reduce noise pollution in a noisy
city.23 In legislating a noise reduction ordinance to protect its
citizens' health, New York provided a reasonable remedy for a
legitimate government purpose. 24 Noise reduction is not arbi-
trary nor is it conscience-shocking because it is rationally related
to the protection of the public welfare.2 5 Therefore, the court
held that there was no due process violation.2"
Following the same reasoning, the court also found that New
York did not violate the equal protection requirements. First,
the court pointed out that air tour providers are not a suspect
class, and therefore, the government restrictions at issue were
entitled to a rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny re-
view.27 Second, New York had a legitimate government purpose
for issuing its restriction, namely noise reduction.28 Finally, New
York's decision to restrict air transportation was rationally re-
lated to reducing noise. 29 Since the rational basis test was satis-
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
21 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law").
22 Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 1995).
23 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *9; see also Kaluczky, 57 F.3d at 211.
24 See SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *9.
25 See id. Noise regulation objectives are to protect the citizens' health (via
their ears). Protecting the health of the public is a legitimate government pur-
pose and not arbitrary. See id.
26 Id.
27 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *8.
28 Id. at *8-9.
29 Id.
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fled, the court found no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. °
In regard to the Supremacy Clause or Airline Deregulation
Act issue, the federal district court's main contention was that
SeaAir is entitled to federal preemption protection only if it is
an air carrier.i The court simply held that SeaAir is not an air
carrier 2.3  Therefore, SeaAir is not covered by federal law and
thus, can be regulated by local law.3
The court argues that SeaAir is not an air carrier under the
legal definition because it does not provide air transportation. 4
The court claims that individuals who travel on the seaplane
tour do not go from a place in one state to another place in
another state. 5 In describing SeaAir's service, the court states
that "they depart from East 23rd Street Seaplane Base, fly
around for a while, then deposit all passengers back where they
started. '36 Crossing into NewJersey airspace does not constitute
a place in another state. 7 The opinion points out that the tour-
ists do not board the plane to go to New Jersey.38 Since SeaAir
cannot meet the requirements to be classified as an "air carrier"
under federal law, the court refuses to grant it federal protec-
tion, and thus, New York is not violating the Supremacy Clause
through its regulations.39
But, the court's refusal to classify SeaAir as an "air carrier"
may be subject to controversy. In determining whether SeaAir is
an air carrier under federal law, it is logical to first analyze the
appropriate statute. Under federal law, "air carrier" means "a
citizen of the United States undertaking by any means, directly
or indirectly, to provide air transportation."40 SeaAir is a United
States citizen, however it is not clear whether it provides air
30 Id. at *9.
31 Id.
32 Id. at *34.
33 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. If an RCNY regulation pre-
empted the Airline Deregulation Act, it would be violating the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause.
'14 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *5-6; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (2).
35 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6.
36 Id.
37 Id. at *5.
18 Id. at *6. The court holds that "[p]assengers do not board a SeaAir tour
plane in order to get to NewJersey (and if they do, they are solely disappointed
when the plane brings them right back to the East River)." Id.
39 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
40 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (2).
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transportation directly or indirectly. New York and the court ar-
gue that SeaAir is not an air carrier because it does not own and
operate the planes that are used in its business; it subcontracts
these duties out to another company.4 Yet, some federal courts
have held that a company whose business was selling tours and
charters is an indirect air carrier.42 This authority is directly ap-
plicable to this fact situation. These holdings show that reasona-
ble people could find that SeaAir is an indirect "air carrier."
However, New York and the court argue that SeaAir is not an
air carrier because it does not provide "air transportation" as
defined by federal law.4 1 "Air transportation" is defined as "for-
eign air transportation, interstate air transportation, or the trans-
portation of mail by aircraft. '4 4 SeaAir argues that since it
operates over both New Jersey and New York state airspace, it
provides interstate transportation. 45 Interstate air transporta-
tion under the code is "the transportation of passengers... by
aircraft.. .between a place in... a State... and a place.. .in an-
other State. '46 SeaAir does charter flights that fly commuters
from New Jersey to New York. 47 That type of air transportation
seems to meet the requirements to be classified as an air
carrier. 4
s
When analyzing only the air tour service of its business, the
fact that SeaAir's tours do cross into New Jersey airspace is un-
disputed.49 Being a sightseeing tour, this space over and around
New Jersey is the place the public is paying to visit. So, a passen-
ger is transported between one place in New York (the base on
23rd) and another place in New Jersey (and/or the views from
its airspace). It seems a reasonable person could find that this
airspace could be considered a place in another State.
41 See SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *4-6.
42 See Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d
522 (9th Cir. 1972); see also Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Int'l Exch. Sch., 357 F. Supp.
819 (D. Utah 1973). These cases dealt with the former 49 U.S.C.S. App. § 1301
(1970). This code, with the same language, was incorporated into 49 U.S.C.S.
§ 40102, by Acts on October 17, 1978 and January 12, 1983.
43 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *5-6.
44 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(5) (emphasis added).
45 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6.
46 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (25).
47 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *2-3.
48 See id. at *4; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (25). SeaAir has provided charter
services in the past. This would seem to definitively characterize SeaAir as an air
carrier. However, even though the court does concede this fact, they fail to ad-
dress the issue.
49 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6.
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A hypothetical may better explain SeaAir's point. For exam-
ple, imagine there is a charter bus company that takes individu-
als from a hotel in New Mexico to see the Grand Canyon in
Arizona. One day, the chartered bus tour takes a group of peo-
ple to see the Grand Canyon and then back to their hotel. This
entire trip is accomplished in one day, over a period of hours.
In this trip, has not the bus taken the tourists from a place in
one state (New Mexico hotel) to a place in another state (Grand
Canyon in Arizona)? Save for the fact that it did not occur in
the air, no one would deny that the bus provided "interstate
transportation" for these individuals under the definition of fed-
eral aviation law.50 The objectives for the hypothetical's bus
charter and for SeaAir's air tours are identical: sightseeing. The
only difference is that one does it by air and one by ground. The
contention that SeaAir provides interstate transportation from
one state to another is not an unreasonable assertion.
Though the court did not decide the issue, New York argued
that SeaAir was not an "air carrier" because it was not licensed.5'
New York was referring to the provision that all air carriers must
obtain and hold an air carrier certificate.52 SeaAir does not have
a certificate. But the lack of a federal air carrier certificate does
not prevent SeaAir from being classified as an (indirect) air car-
rier .5  There is no language in the statute that requires an air
carrier to have a certificate to be classified as an air carrier.
SeaAir may be in violation of that provision that mandates certif-
icate compliance, but this fact has no bearing on the Act's defi-
nition of "air carrier" itself.
The opinion that the court issued with respect to SeaAir's sta-
tus as an "air carrier" is not unreasonable. 54 There are definitely
some ambiguities in the law that do not address some substan-
tive issues in this case. It is not clear whether SeaAir is an indi-
rect air carrier, or whether it is providing air transportation.
However, a reasonable person could find for either argument in
this case. Since a reasonable person could find for SeaAir, New
York did not meet its burden of proof. The United States Fed-
5, See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (25).
51 SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *5 n.1.
52 See 49 U.S.C. § 41101 (a)(1) ("An air carrier may provide air transportation
only if the air carrier holds a certificate issued under this chapter.").
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2). This law states that an air carrier "means a
citizen of the United States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to
provide air transportation." Id.
54 See SeaAir, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12115, at *6.
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eral District Court for the Southern District of New York was
incorrect in granting summary judgment for New York. The
court should have allowed the Supremacy Clause issue to go to
trial for a reasonable factfinder could find for SeaAir.
4tLAS. It*
